The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion by Sasaki, Tatsuya & Uchida, Satoshi
1 
 
The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion 1 
Sasaki T, Uchida S. 2013 The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion. Proc. R. Soc. B. 280, 2 
20122498; doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.2498 (published 5 December 2012). Reprint is available from 3 
http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/cgi/reprint/rspb.2012.2498?ijkey=X87Vy0Xhm7hwMqH&keytype=ref 4 
Tatsuya Sasakia,1 and Satoshi Uchidab 5 
aEvolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 6 
Schlossplatz 1, 2631 Laxenburg, Austria 7 
bResearch Center, RINRI Institute, Misaki-cho 3-1-10, Chiyoda-ku, 101-8385 Tokyo, Japan 8 
1To whom correspondence should be addressed.  9 
E-mail: sasakit@iiasa.ac.at 10 
6 December 2012 11 
Preprint version 2.0 12 
13 
2 
 
Summary: The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely 14 
found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly 15 
assume peer sanctioning, whereby a punisher imposes penalties on freeriders at a cost to itself. 16 
It is well known that such costly punishment has two substantial difficulties. First, a rare 17 
punishing cooperator barely subverts the asocial society of freeriders, and second, natural 18 
selection often eliminates punishing cooperators in the presence of non-punishing cooperators 19 
(namely, “second-order” freeriders). We present a game-theoretical model of social exclusion 20 
in which a punishing cooperator can exclude freeriders from benefit sharing. We show that 21 
such social exclusion can overcome the above-mentioned difficulties even if it is costly and 22 
stochastic. The results do not require a genetic relationship, repeated interaction, reputation, or 23 
group selection. Instead, only a limited number of freeriders are required to prevent the second-24 
order freeriders from eroding the social immune system. 25 
Key words: evolution of cooperation; ostracism; costly punishment; second-order freerider; 26 
public goods; evolutionary game theory 27 
28 
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1. Introduction 29 
We frequently engage in voluntary joint enterprises with nonrelatives, activities that are 30 
fundamental to society. The evolution of cooperative behaviors is an important issue because 31 
without any supporting mechanism [1], natural selection often favours those that contribute 32 
less at the expense of those that contribute more. A minimal situation could easily cause the 33 
ruin of a commune of cooperators, namely, the “tragedy of the commons” [2]. Here we 34 
consider different types of punishment, such as a monetary fine (e.g., [3–7]) and ostracism (e.g., 35 
[8–11]), for the evolution of cooperation. Punishment can reduce the expected payoff for the 36 
opponent, and subsequently, change natural selection preferences, to encourage additional 37 
contributions to communal efforts [12]. Our model looks at this situation, because “very little 38 
work has addressed questions about the form that punishment is likely to take in reality and 39 
about the relative efficacy of different types of punishment” [13].  40 
Here, we choose to focus on social exclusion, which is a common and powerful tool to penalise 41 
deviators in human societies, and includes behaviors such as eviction, shunning and ignoring 42 
[14–16]. For self-sustaining human systems, indeed, the ability to distinguish among 43 
individuals and clarify who should participate in the sharing of communal benefits is crucial 44 
and expected (of its members) [17]. A specific example is found in the case of traffic violators 45 
who are punished, often strictly by suspending or revoking their driver license for public roads. 46 
Among non-humans, shunning through partner switching is a common mechanism for inequity 47 
aversion and cooperation enforcement [13,18,19]. Experimental studies have shown, for 48 
instance, that chimpanzees can use a mechanism to exclude less cooperative partners from 49 
potential collaborations [20], or that reef fish will terminate interaction with cleaner fish that 50 
cheat by eating the host’s mucus rather than parasites [21]. 51 
In joint enterprises, by excluding freeriders from benefit sharing, the punishers can naturally 52 
benefit, because such exclusion often decreases the number of beneficiaries, with little effect 53 
on the total benefit. Consider the example of the division of a pie provided by some volunteers 54 
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to a group. If a person is one of the volunteers, it may be justifiable in terms of fairness to 55 
suggest or even force freeriders to refrain from sharing in the pie. Although excluding 56 
freeriders can be stressful, it increases the share of the pie for the contributors, including the 57 
person who performs the actual exclusion. If the situation calls for it, the excluded freerider’s 58 
share of the group benefits may separately be redistributed among the remaining members in 59 
the group [22,23]. Therefore, in either case, the excluded member will obtain nothing from the 60 
joint enterprise and the exclusion causes immediate increases in the payoff for the punisher and 61 
also the other remaining members in the group.  62 
This is a “self-serving” form of punishment [13,18]. It is of importance that if the cost of 63 
excluding is smaller than the reallocated benefit, social exclusion can provide immediate net 64 
benefits even to the punisher. This can potentially motivate the group members to contribute to 65 
the exclusion of freeriders, however, our understanding of how cooperation unfolds through 66 
social exclusion is still “uncharted territory” [24].    67 
Most game-theoretical works on cooperation with punishment have focused on other forms of 68 
punishment, for example, costly punishment that reduces the payoffs of both the punishers and 69 
those who are punished. As is well known, costly punishment poses fundamental puzzles with 70 
regard to its emergence and maintenance. First of all, costly punishment is unlikely to emerge 71 
in a sea of freeriders, in which almost all freeriders are unaffected, and a rare punisher would 72 
have to decrease in its payoff through punishing the left and right [18,25–27]. Moreover, 73 
although initially prevalent, punishers can stabilise cooperation, while non-punishing 74 
cooperators (so-called “second-order freeriders”) can undermine full cooperation once it is 75 
established [3,13,17,24,29].  76 
In terms of self-serving punishments, however, we have only started to confront the puzzles 77 
that emerge in these scenarios. We ask here, what happens if social exclusion is applied?: that 78 
is, do players move toward excluding others?, and can freeriders be eliminated? Or, will others 79 
in the group resist? Our main contribution is to provide a detailed comparative analysis for 80 
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social exclusion and costly punishment, two different types of punishment, from the viewpoint 81 
of their emergence and maintenance. With the self-serving function, social exclusion is 82 
predicted to more easily emerge and be maintained than costly punishment.  83 
Few theoretical works have investigated the conditions under which cooperation can evolve by 84 
the exclusion of freeriders. Our model requires no additional modules, such as a genetic 85 
relationship, repeated games, reputation, or group selection. Considering these modules is 86 
imperative for understanding the evolution of cooperation in realistic settings. In fact, these 87 
modules may have already been incorporated in earlier game-theoretical models that included 88 
the exclusion of freeriders [30–32], but we are interested in first looking at the most minimal of 89 
situations to get at the core relative efficacy of costly punishment versus social exclusion. 90 
2. Game-theoretical model and analysis 91 
To describe these punishment schemes in detail, we begin with standard public good games 92 
with a group size of 2n ≥  (e.g., [26,33,34]) in an infinitely large, well-mixed population of 93 
players. We specifically apply a replicator system [35] for the dynamic analysis, as based on 94 
preferentially imitating strategies of the more successful individuals. In the game, each player 95 
has two options. The “cooperator” contributes 0c >  to a common pool, and the “defector” 96 
contributes nothing. The total contribution is multiplied by a factor of 1r >  and then shared 97 
equally among all (n) group members. A cooperator will thus pay a net cost (1 )c r nσ = −  98 
through its own contribution. If all cooperate, the group yields the optimal benefit ( 1)c r −  for 99 
each; if all defect, the group does nothing. To adhere to the spirit of the tragedy of the 100 
commons, we hereafter assume that r n<  holds, in which case a defecting player can improve 101 
its payoff by 0σ > , whatever the coplayers do, and the defectors dominate the cooperators. To 102 
observe the robustness for stochastic effects, we also consider an individual-based simulation 103 
with a pairwise comparison process [36,37]. See the electronic supplementary material (ESM) 104 
for these details. 105 
(a) Costly punishment 106 
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We then introduce a third strategy, “punisher”, which contributes c, and moreover, punishes 107 
the defectors. Punishing incurs a cost 0γ >  per defector to the punisher and imposes a fine 108 
0β >  per punisher on the defector. We denote by x, y, and z the frequencies of the cooperator 109 
(C), defector (D), and punisher (P), respectively. Thus, x, y, z ≥ 0 and 1x y z+ + = . Given the 110 
expected payoffs PS for the three strategies (S = C, D, and P), the replicator system is written 111 
by 112 
C D P( ),   ( ),   ( ),x x P P y y P P z z P P= − = − = −          (2.1) 113 
where C D P:P xP yP zP= + +  describes the average payoff in the entire population. Three 114 
homogeneous states ( 1x = , 1y = , and 1z = ) are equilibria. Indeed, 115 
C ( 1)( )
rcP n x z
n
σ= − + − ,          (2.2a) 116 
D ( 1)( ) ( 1)
rcP n x z n z
n
β= − + − − ,         (2.2b) 117 
P ( 1)( ) ( 1)
rcP n x z n y
n
σ γ= − + − − − .         (2.2c)  118 
Here the common first term denotes the benefit that resulted from the expected ( 1)( )n x z− +  119 
contributors among the ( 1n − ) coplayers, and ( 1)n zβ −  and ( 1)n yγ −  give the expected fine on 120 
a defector and expected cost to a punisher, respectively. 121 
First, consider only the defectors and punishers (figure 1). Thus, 1y z+ = , and the replicator 122 
system reduces to P D(1 )( )z z z P P= − − . Solving P DP P=  results in that, if the interior 123 
equilibrium R between the two strategies exists, it is uniquely determined by 124 
( 1)1
( 1)( )
nz
n
β σ
β γ
− −
= −
− +
.           (2.3) 125 
The point R is unstable. If the fine is much smaller: 0( 1) :nβ σ β< − = , punishment has no 126 
effect on defection dominance, or otherwise, R appears and the dynamics turns into bistable 127 
[33,34]: R separates the state space into basins of attraction of the different homogeneous 128 
states for both the defector and excluder. The smaller γ  or larger β , the more the coordinate 129 
of R shifts to the defector end: the more relaxed the initial condition required to establish a 130 
punisher population (figure 1a). Note that a rare punisher is incapable of invading a defector 131 
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population because the resident defectors, almost all unpunished, earn 0 on average, and the 132 
rare punisher does ( 1) 0nσ γ− − − < . 133 
Next, consider all of the cooperators, defectors, and punishers (figure 1b). Without defectors, 134 
no punishing cost arises. Thus, no natural selection occurs between the cooperators and 135 
punishers, and the edge between the cooperators and punishers ( 1x z+ = ) consists of fixed 136 
points. A segment consisting of these fixed points with 0z β β>  is stable against the invasion 137 
of rare defectors, and the other segment not so [33,34]. Therefore, this stable segment appears 138 
on the edge PC if and only if the edge PD is bistable. We denote by K0 the boundary point with 139 
0z β β= . There can thus be two attractors: the vertex D and segment PK0. The smaller γ  or 140 
larger β , the broader the basin of attraction for the mixture states of the contributors. That is, 141 
the higher the punishment efficiency, the more relaxed the initial condition required to 142 
establish a cooperative state. This may collaborate with evidence from recent public-good 143 
experiments [38–40], which suggest the positive effects of increasing the punishment 144 
efficiency on average cooperation. 145 
However, the stability of PK0 is not robust for small perturbations of the population. Since 146 
P CP P<  holds in the interior space, an interior trajectory eventually converges to the boundary, 147 
and P C( ) ( )( ) 0d z x dt z x P P= − < : the frequency ratio of the punishers to cooperators 148 
decreases over time. Thus, if rare defectors are introduced, for example by mutation or 149 
immigration, into a stable population of the two types of contributors, the punishers will 150 
gradually decline for each elimination of the defectors. Such small perturbations push the 151 
population into an unstable regime around K0C, where the defectors can invade the population 152 
and then take it over. See figure S1 of ESM and also [26] for individual-based simulations. 153 
(b) Social exclusion 154 
We turn next to social exclusion. The third strategy is now replaced with the excluder (E) that 155 
contributes c and also tries to exclude defectors from sharing benefits at a cost to itself of 156 
0γ >  per defector. The multiplied contribution is shared equally among the remaining 157 
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members in the group. We assume that an excluder succeeds in excluding a defector with the 158 
probability β  and that the excluded defector earns nothing. For simplicity, we conservatively 159 
assume that the total sanctioning cost for an excluder is given by γ  times the number of 160 
defectors in a group, whatever others do. 161 
We focus on perfect exclusion with 1β = : exclusion never fails. Under this condition, however, 162 
we can analyse the nature of social exclusion considered for cooperation. Indeed, we formalise 163 
the expected payoffs, as follows:  164 
1
C ( 1) (1 ) ( 1)1
n rc yP c r z n
n z
−= − − − −
−
,        (2.4a) 165 
1
D (1 ) ( 1)1
n rc xP z n
n z
−= − −
−
,          (2.4b) 166 
E ( 1) ( 1)P c r n yγ= − − − .          (2.4c)  167 
Equation (2.4c) describes that the excluder can constantly receive the group optimum ( 1)c r −  168 
at the exclusion cost expected as ( 1)n yγ − . In equations (2.4a) and (2.4b), 1(1 )nz −− denotes the 169 
probability that we find no excluder in the ( 1n − ) coplayers, and if so, ( 1) (1 )n y z− −  and 170 
( 1) (1 )n x z− −  give the expected numbers of the defectors and cooperators, respectively, 171 
among the coplayers. Hence, the second term of equations (2.4a) specifies an expected benefit 172 
that could have occurred without freeriding, and equation (2.4b) describes an expected amount 173 
that a defector has nibbled from the group benefit, in the group with no excluder. The expected 174 
payoffs for any β  are formalised in ESM.     175 
First, the dynamics between the excluders and defectors can only exhibit bi-stability or 176 
excluder dominance for 1β =  (figure 2a). Considering that D 0P =  holds for whatever the 177 
fraction of excluders, solving E 0P =  gives that, if the interior equilibrium R exists, it is 178 
uniquely determined by 179 
( 1)1
( 1)
r cz
n γ
−
= −
−
.           (2.5) 180 
The point R is unstable. As before, for larger values of γ , the dynamics between the two 181 
strategies have been bistable. The smaller the value of γ , the larger the basin of attraction to 182 
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the vertex E. In contrast to costly punishment, an excluder population can evolve, irrespective 183 
of the initial condition, for sufficiently small values of γ . When decreasingγ  beyond a 184 
threshold value, R exits at the vertex D, and thus, the current dynamics of bi-stability turns into 185 
excluder dominance. From substituting z = 0 into equation (2.5), the threshold value is 186 
calculated as 0 ( 1) ( 1)r c nγ = − − . We note that the dynamics exhibit defector dominance no 187 
matter what γ , if β  is smaller than 0z , which is from solving 
1(1 ) ( 1) ( 1)n rc n n c rβ −− − > − : 188 
the unexcluded rare defector is better off than the resident excluders. 189 
Next, consider all three strategies (figure 2b). Solving C DP P=  results in 190 
1
1
0
( 1)1 :
( 1)
nn rz z
r n
− −
= − = −  .         
(2.6) 191 
By the assumption r n< , we have 00 1z< < . Let us denote by K0 a point at which this line 192 
connects to the edge EC ( 1x y+ = ). This edge consists of fixed points, each of which 193 
corresponds to a mixed state of the excluders and cooperators. These fixed points on the 194 
segment EK0 ( 0z z> ) are stable, and those on the segment K0C are unstable. Similarly, solving 195 
E CP P=  gives 196 
1
2
11 :
nnz z
rc
γ − = − = 
 
.          (2.7) 197 
We denote by K1 a point at which the line 1z z=  connects to EC. These two lines are parallel, 198 
and thus, there is no generic interior equilibrium. 199 
Importantly, the time derivative of z x  is positive in the interior region with 1z z< . Therefore, 200 
the dynamics around the segment K1K0 are found to be the opposite of costly punishment, if 201 
1 0z z>  (or otherwise, K1K0 has been unstable against rare defectors). In this case, introducing 202 
rare defectors results in that, for each elimination of the defectors, the excluders will gradually 203 
rise along K1K0 yet fall along the segment EK1. Consequently, with such small perturbations, 204 
the population can remain attracted to the vicinity of K1, not converging to D. Moreover, if 205 
0γ γ< , the excluders dominate the defectors, and thus, all interior trajectories converge to the 206 
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segment EK0, which appears globally stable (figure 2b). This result remains robust for the 207 
intermediate exclusion probability (figure 3). See figures S2 and S3 of ESM for individual-208 
based simulations. 209 
3. Discussion 210 
Our results regarding social exclusion show that it can be a powerful incentive and appears in 211 
stark contrast to costly punishment. What is the logic behind this outcome? First, it is a fact 212 
that the exclusion of defectors can decrease the number of beneficiaries, especially when it 213 
does not affect the contributions, thereby increasing the share of the group benefit. Therefore, 214 
in a mixed group of excluders and defectors, the excluder’s net payoff can become higher than 215 
the excluded defector’s payoff, which is nothing, especially if the cost to exclude is sufficiently 216 
low. If social exclusion is capable of 100% rejection at a cheap cost, it can thus emerge in a sea 217 
of defectors and dominate them. In our model, self-serving punishment can emerge even when 218 
freeriding is initially prevalent by allowing high net benefits from the self-serving action. 219 
Moreover, we find that an increase in the fraction of excluders produces a higher probability of 220 
an additional increase in the excluder’s payoff. This effect can yield the well-known Simpson’s 221 
paradox (e.g., [41]): the excluders can obtain a higher average payoff than the cooperators, 222 
despite the fact that the cooperators always do better than the excluders for any mixed group of 223 
the cooperators, defectors, and excluders. Hence, in the presence of defectors, the replicator 224 
dynamics often favour the excluders at the expense of the cooperators. Significantly, if a player 225 
may occasionally mutate to a defector, social exclusion is more likely than costly punishment 226 
to sustain a cooperative state in which all contribute. In our model, a globally stable, 227 
cooperative regime can be sustained when solving the second-order freerider problem by 228 
allowing mutation to freeriders. 229 
Sanctioning the second-order freeriders has also often been considered for preventing their 230 
proliferation [3,29,34,36], although such second-order sanction appears rare in experimental 231 
settings [42]. And, allowing for our simple model, it is obvious that in the presence of 232 
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defectors and cooperators, a second-order punisher that also punishes the cooperators is worse 233 
off than the existing punisher, and thus, does not affect defector dominance as in our main 234 
model. However, given that excluding more coplayers can cause an additional increase in the 235 
share of the group benefit, it is worth exploring whether the second-order excluder that also 236 
excludes the cooperators is more powerful than the excluder. Interestingly, our preliminary 237 
individual-based investigation often finds that second-order excluders are undermined by the 238 
excluders and cooperators, which forms a stable coexistence (figures S4 of EMS): second-239 
order exclusion can be redundant.   240 
A fundamental assumption of the model is that defection can be detected with no or little cost. 241 
This assumption appears most applicable to local public goods and team production settings in 242 
which the coworker’s contribution can be easily monitored. However, if the monitoring of co-243 
players for defection imposes a certain cost on the excluders, the cooperators dominate the 244 
excluders, and the exclusion-based full cooperation is no longer stable. A typical example is 245 
found in a potluck party that will often rotate so that every member takes charge of the party by 246 
rotation. This rotation system can promote the equal sharing of the hosting cost; or otherwise, 247 
no one would take turn playing host.      248 
We assessed by extensive numerical investigations the robustness of our results with respect to 249 
the following variants (figures S5 and S6 of EMS). First, we considered a different group size 250 
n [3,43], In costly punishment, the stable segment PK0 expands with n, yet our main results 251 
were unaffected: with small perturbations, the population eventually converges to a non-252 
cooperative state in which all freeride. In social exclusion, our results remain qualitatively 253 
robust with smaller and larger sizes (n = 4 and n = 10), but the limit exclusion cost γ  becomes 254 
more restricted as n increases. Next, we considered a situation in which a punisher or excluder 255 
can choose the number of defectors they sanction. For simplicity, here we assume that each of 256 
them sanctions only one [22,44], who is selected randomly from all defectors in the group. Our 257 
results remain unaffected, except that social exclusion becomes incapable of emerging in a 258 
defector population, in which the payoff of a rare excluder is only given by 259 
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( 1) 0rc n c γ− − − < . To bring forth the possibility of an emergence, a rare excluder is required 260 
to exclude more than / ( )n rc c γ− +  defectors.     261 
Our results spur new questions about earlier studies on the evolution of cooperation with 262 
punishment. A fascinating extension is to the social structures through which individuals 263 
interact. To date, a large body of work on cooperation has looked at how costly punishment 264 
can propagate throughout a social network [45–47]: for example, the interplay of costly 265 
punishment and reputation can promote cooperation [48]; strict-and-severe punishment and 266 
cooperation can jointly evolve with continuously varying strategies [49]; and evolution can 267 
favour anti-social punishment that targets cooperators [50]. Our results show that social 268 
exclusion as considered is so simple, yet extremely powerful. That is, even intuitively applying 269 
it to previous studies can help us much in understanding how humans and non-humans have 270 
been incentivized to exclude freeriders.  271 
To resist the exclusion, it is likely that conditional cooperators capable of detecting ostracism 272 
(e.g., [8]) evolve. This would then raise the comprehensive cost of exclusion to the excluders 273 
because of more difficulties of finding and less opportunities of excluding freeriders. This 274 
situation can then result in driving an arms race of the exclusion technique and exclusion 275 
detection system. An extensive investigation for understanding joint evolution of these systems 276 
is for future work. 277 
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Figure captions 409 
 410 
Figure 1. Effects of punishing freeriders. (a) Between the punishers and freeriders. I, If β  is 411 
smaller than a threshold value 0 ( 1)nβ σ= − , where (1 )c r nσ = −  describes a net cost for the 412 
single contributor, the defectors dominate. II, If β  is greater than 0β , punishing leads to 413 
bistable competition between the two strategies. With increasing β  or decreasing γ , the 414 
minimal frequency of the punishers outcompeting the defectors decreases. However, the 415 
excluders cannot dominate the defectors for finitely large values of β . Parameters: group size 416 
5n = , multiplication factor 3r = , and contribution cost 1c = . (b) In the presence of second-417 
order freeriders. The triangle represents the state space, {( , , ) : , , 0,  1}x y z x y z x y z∆ = ≥ + + = , 418 
where x, y, and z are the frequencies of the cooperators, defectors, and punishers, respectively. 419 
The vertices, C, D, and P, correspond to the three homogeneous states in which all are the 420 
cooperators ( 1x = ), defectors ( 1y = ), or punishers ( 1z = ). The edge PC consists of a 421 
continuum of equilibria. The defectors dominate the cooperators. Here we specifically assume 422 
0.5β =  and 0.03γ = , which result in an unstable equilibrium R within PD and the 423 
segmentation of PC into stable part PK0 and unstable part K0C. The interior of ∆ is separated 424 
into the basins of attraction of D and PK0. In fact, given the occasional mutation to a defector, 425 
the population’s state must leave PK0 and then enter the neighborhood of the unstable segment 426 
K0C because P CP P>  holds over the interior space. The population eventually converges to D. 427 
428 
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 429 
Figure 2. Effects of excluding freeriders. (a) Between the excluders and freeriders. I, If β  is 430 
smaller than a threshold value 0z , the defectors dominate. II, If β  is greater than 0z , 431 
exclusion leads to bistable competition between the two strategies. With increasing β  or 432 
decreasing γ , the minimal frequency of the excluders outcompeting the defectors decreases. 433 
III, If β  and γ  are sufficiently high and low, the excluders dominate. The parameters are as 434 
in figure 1a. (b) In the presence of second-order freeriders. The triangle ∆ is as in figure 1b, 435 
except that z denotes the excluder frequency and the vertex E corresponds to its homogeneous 436 
state. Similarly, the edge EC consists of a continuum of equilibria. Here we specifically 437 
assume 1β =  and 0.03γ = . EC is separated into stable and unstable segments. The coloured 438 
area in the interior of ∆ is the region in which E CP P>  holds. In fact, given the occasional 439 
mutation to a defector, the population’s state must converge to the vicinity of the point K1, 440 
because the advantage of the excluders over the cooperators becomes broken when the 441 
population’s state goes up beyond K1. 442 
443 
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 444 
Figure 3. Effects of intermediate social exclusion in the presence of second-order freeriders. 445 
The parameters and triangles are as in figure 1, except that 0.5β =  and 0.03γ =  (a), 0.13 (b), 446 
0.18 (c), or 0.28 (d). EC is separated into stable and unstable segments. The coloured area is 447 
the interior region in which E CP P>  holds. (a) The dynamics of ED are unidirectional to E. All 448 
interior trajectories converge onto the stable segment EK0. Moreover, occasionally mutating to 449 
a defector leads to upgrading E to a global attractor. (b-d) An unstable equilibrium R appears 450 
on ED. The interior space is separated into the basins of attraction of D and EK0. R is a saddle 451 
(b) or source (c and d). In (c) especially, the interior space has a saddle point Q. Given the 452 
mutant defectors, the population’s state around EK0 will gradually move to K1 (b and c), or to 453 
the unstable segment K0C (d). The last case is followed by a convergence toward D. 454 
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Electronic supplementary material (ESM) 1 
This includes: Materials and methods, and Supplementary figures, S1–S6 2 
Materials and methods 3 
We first determine the strategy’s payoffs in public good games with social exclusion, then 4 
show details of individual-based simulations for assessing the robustness with respect to 5 
stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. 6 
Payoffs for social exclusion: We consider the replicator dynamics for the cooperator (C), 7 
defector (D), and excluder (E), with frequencies of x, y, and z, respectively. Thus, ,  ,  0x y z ≥  8 
and 1x y z+ + = . We denote the expected payoff values for the three strategies by PS, with S = 9 
C, D, and E, respectively. The replicator system is given by 10 
C D E( ),   ( ),   ( ),x x P P y y P P z z P P= − = − = −                   11 
where C D E:P xP yP zP= + +  describes the average payoff in the entire population. We denote by 12 
X, Y, and Z the number of the cooperators, defectors, and excluders, respectively, among the 13 
( 1n − ) coplayers around a focal player. Then, if W of the Y defectors have not been excluded 14 
by every excluder, the expected payoff for each strategy is given by 15 
1 1
0 0 0
n n X Y
S S S
X Y W
P pπ
− − −
= = =
= ∑ ∑ ∑ .         (S1) 16 
In equation (S1), Sp  denotes the payoff for the focal player who follows the strategy S among 17 
the ( 1n − ) coplayers with a configuration of { , , , }X Y Z W , and Sπ  denotes the probability to 18 
find the specified coplayers. Using a function )(Zα  that denotes the probability that all of the 19 
Z excluders fail to exclude a targeted defector, we have 20 
C
( 1)
1
rc X Zp c
X W Z
+ +
= −
+ + +
,                  (S2) 21 
D
( )( )
1
rc X Zp Z
X W Z
α +=
+ + +
,                  (S3) 22 
E Cp p Yγ= − ,                      (S4) 23 
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In equations (S5) and (S6), 
1
, ,
n
X Y Z
− 
 
 
 and 
Y
W
 
 
 
 represent the multinomial and binomial 26 
coefficients. Thus, 
1
, ,
X Y Zn x y z
X Y Z
− 
 
 
 describes the probability of finding the ( 1n − ) coplayers 27 
with X cooperators, Y defectors, and Z excluders, and ( ) [1 ( )]W Y W
Y
Z Z
W
α α −
 
− 
 
 describes the 28 
probability that W of the Y defectors have not been excluded. In the paper, we assume 29 
( ) (1 )ZZα β= − , where β  is the exclusion probability: an excluder succeeds in excluding a 30 
defector. 31 
Individual-based simulation: Here, we consider a finitely large, well-mixed population with 32 
M interacting individuals. For the dynamic analysis, instead of the replicator system [35], we 33 
implement a pairwise comparison process among finite individuals [36,37], which is based on 34 
preferentially imitating strategies of more successful individuals. We assume that the 35 
individual strategies are updated asynchronously as follows. First, an individual i is selected at 36 
random and then earns its “average” payoff ip  after engaging in T games with coplayers 37 
randomly selected in each case. Second, the focal individual i faces a model individual j who is 38 
drawn at random, with its average payoff jp  that is calculated throughout independent T 39 
games. If i jp p≥ , no update occurs; or otherwise, i will adopt j’s strategy, with the probability 40 
given by  41 
1
1 exp( ( ))i j j iK p p
θ → = + − −
,                 42 
where K denotes the selection strength. Finally, the focal individual i can mutate and turn into a 43 
cooperator, defector, or punisher (or excluder) with probabilities µC, µD, µP (or µE). Our 44 
numerical results demonstrated in figures S1–S6 are robust with respect to changes in the 45 
parameter values of M, µC, µD, µP, µE, and K.46 
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Supplementary figures 47 
 48 
Figure S1. Individual-based simulation for public good games with costly punishment. We 49 
began with a 100%-punisher population to observe its stability. First, because the punishing of 50 
mutant defectors is costly, the former major punishers (blue) will gradually be replaced by the 51 
initially minor cooperators (namely, second-order freeriders, black). Next, when a critical 52 
fraction of punishers is lost, the mutant defectors (red) succeed in invading the population and 53 
then quickly prevail. The parameters are as in figure 1b: group size 5n = , multiplication factor 54 
3r = , contribution cost 1c = , punishment cost 0.5β = , and punishment fine 0.03γ = . The 55 
defectors dominate the cooperators, and the excluders and defectors are under bistable 56 
competition. Other parameters are as the population size 410M = , sample game count 50T = , 57 
selection strength 200K = , mutation rate to D 3D 5 10µ
−= × , mutation rates to C and P 58 
5
C P 10µ µ
−= =  (low mutation rate) or 3C P 10µ µ
−= =  (high mutation rate), and the unit of 59 
evolutionary time t describes 104 times the iteration of the update sequence. 60 
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 61 
Figure S2. Individual-based simulation for public good games with perfect social exclusion. 62 
The parameters are as in figure 2b: 5n = , 3r = , 1c = , exclusion probability 1β = , and 63 
exclusion cost 0.03γ = . We began with a 100%-punisher population to observe the 64 
establishment of a cooperative state. Whether the minimal mutation rate is high (10-3) or low 65 
(10-5), the former major defectors (red) will soon be replaced by the initially minor excluders 66 
(blue), whose part will then be gradually replaced by the cooperators (black). The population 67 
eventually converges to a certain mixture state of the contributors without a second-order 68 
freerider problem. The final state has been indicated by point K1 in figures 2b. The simulation 69 
parameters are as in figure S1. 70 
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 71 
Figure S3. Individual-based simulation for public good games with intermediate social 72 
exclusion. The parameters are as in figure 3: 5n = , 3r = , 1c = , and 0.5β = . We began with 73 
different initial conditions, depending on the value of γ : 90% cooperators and 10% excluders 74 
for 0.03γ =  (a) and 100% excluders for 0.13γ =  (b), 0.18 (c), or 0.28 (d). (a) The former 75 
major cooperators (black) will gradually be replaced by the initially minor excluders (blue), 76 
which then stably occupy the entire population (b and c). The initially minor cooperators will 77 
first replace part of the excluders, and the population will then converge to a certain mixture 78 
state, which has been indicated by the point K1 in figures 3b and 3c, respectively (d). As in (b 79 
and c), the cooperators will gradually expand. When a critical fraction of the excluders is lost 80 
(the point K0), the mutant defectors (black) succeed in invading the population and will then 81 
quickly prevail to 100%. The simulation parameters are as in figure S1 with the low mutation 82 
rate. 83 
6 
 
 84 
Figure S4. Individual-based simulation for public good games with second-order social 85 
exclusion. The parameters are as in figure 2b, except that 0.03γ =  (low exclusion cost) or 86 
0.28γ =  (high exclusion cost). We began with the initial condition: 100% second-order 87 
excluders (green) who in the presence of the defectors, also exclude the cooperators, as well as 88 
the defectors (with the same cost and probability). The initial residents will first be replaced 89 
with the excluders (blue), and then are partially invaded by the cooperators (black): the 90 
population will converge to a certain mixture state of the contributors, whether with a high or 91 
low exclusion cost. The simulation parameters are as in figure S1. 92 
7 
 
 93 
Figure S5. Effect of different group sizes. The parameters are as in figure 2b, for perfect 94 
exclusion (a) and (b), and in figure 3, for intermediate exclusion (c–h). The initial conditions 95 
are 100% second-order excluders in (a) and (b) and 100% excluders in (c–h). 96 
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 97 
Figure S6. Effect of options to choose the number of sanctioned defectors. The model and 98 
simulation parameters, and initial conditions are as in figure S1, for costly punishment (top), 99 
and in figure S3, for intermediate exclusion (middle and bottom, a–d). Here we assume that a 100 
punisher or excluder is willing to sanction only one defector selected at random from all 101 
defectors in the group. The results are almost same as in figures S1 and S3. 102 
